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INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in 
Matter of G-G-S- that a noncitizen’s mental health status at 
the time of an offense is irrelevant to determining whether the 
offense is a “particularly serious crime” for immigration 
purposes.1  Since a “particularly serious crime” is a bar to 
asylum and withholding of removal, it can result in a 
noncitizen’s deportation to a country where he or she faces a 
serious risk of persecution.  In deciding that immigration 
judges “are constrained by how mental health issues were 
addressed as part of the criminal proceedings,” the BIA failed 
to recognize the many reasons why criminal proceedings 
often do not actually take into account the role of mental 
illness.2  This Essay explicitly examines those reasons in 
arguing that evidence of mental illness should be permitted 
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 1 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 339 (BIA 2014). 
 2 Id.  
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as part of the “particularly serious crime” determination. 
I 
THE BIA’S RECENT DECISION IN MATTER OF G-G-S- 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an 
individual becomes ineligible for asylum and withholding of 
removal if the immigration judge determines that “the alien, 
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly 
serious crime, is a danger to the community of the United 
States.”3  Neither the INA nor its regulations define the term 
“particularly serious crime.”4  Accordingly, its meaning has 
been developed through case law.  The BIA generally applies a 
multifactor test to determine whether a conviction constitutes 
a “particularly serious crime.”5  These factors include “the 
nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying 
facts of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and 
most importantly whether the type and circumstances of the 
crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the 
community.”6  The BIA does not require a separate 
determination of dangerousness after the noncitizen is found 
to have committed a particularly serious crime.7  Rather, the 
“essential key” to the particularly serious crime determination 
is “whether the nature of the crime is one which indicates 
that the alien poses a danger to the community.”8 
Before Matter of G-G-S-, an immigration judge could have 
considered an individual’s mental health status at the time of 
an offense as part of the circumstances and underlying facts 
of the conviction, as well as in considering dangerousness.  
Taking the noncitizen’s mental health into consideration 
could have potentially helped mitigate the seriousness of an 
offense by explaining the context in which it occurred.  For 
example, if a noncitizen with schizophrenia was convicted for 
making threats while suffering from paranoid delusions, an 
immigration judge could have previously decided that the 
circumstances were an extenuating factor.  Even if this 
individual pleaded guilty and never raised the issue of mental 
 
 3 Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 4 Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (2015). 
 5 Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 246–47 (BIA 1982). 
 6 Id. at 247. 
 7 In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (BIA 2007). 
 8 Matter of Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357, 360 (BIA 1986); see also 
Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing 
dangerousness as “the pivotal standard by which particularly serious crimes 
are judged”). 
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health during the criminal proceedings, the immigration 
judge still could have considered evidence regarding mental 
health at the time of the offense, as the BIA had specifically 
held that “all reliable information may be considered in 
making a particularly serious crime determination, 
including . . . information outside the confines of a record of 
conviction.”9 
While purporting to rely on such precedents, Matter of G-
G-S- effectively carved out an exception from the general rule 
that all reliable information may be considered in the 
“particularly serious crime” determination.  The BIA singled 
out a noncitizen’s mental health at the time of the offense as 
a fact that the immigration judge cannot consider.  The BIA’s 
rationale for prohibiting immigration judges from taking 
mental health into account was that doing so would “go 
behind the decisions of the criminal judge and reassess any 
ruling on criminal culpability.”10  The BIA reasoned that the 
fact finders in criminal proceedings “have expertise in the 
applicable State and Federal criminal law, are informed by 
the evidence presented by the defendant and the prosecution, 
and have the benefit of weighing all the factors firsthand.”11 
In addition, the BIA observed that there are several ways 
during criminal proceedings to raise the issue of a 
defendant’s mental condition.  These include challenging 
competency to stand trial; raising the affirmative defense of 
not guilty by reason of insanity; showing the absence of the 
mens rea required for a conviction; and arguing that mental 
health should be a mitigating factor for sentencing.12  In 
addition, the BIA noted that mental health issues may be 
raised in post-conviction motions, appeals, and petitions.13 
Since the respondent in Matter of G-G-S- had not presented 
any evidence of “a plea of guilty by reason of insanity,” and no 
findings regarding insanity were made during his criminal 
proceedings, the BIA concluded that his mental illness should 
not be considered as part of the “particularly serious crime” 
analysis.14  This reasoning is deeply flawed for the reasons 
discussed below. 
II 
 
 9 In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (BIA 2007) (emphasis added). 
 10 Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 345 (BIA 2014). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
 13 Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
 14 Id. at 346. 
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THE FLAWED LOGIC OF MATTER OF G-G-S- 
In prohibiting immigration judges from considering a 
noncitizen’s mental health status at the time of an offense, 
the BIA assumes that any issues related to mental health 
have already been handled by the criminal court, so there is 
no need for the immigration judge to stir this pot again.  The 
reality, however, is that defendants often do not raise the 
issue of mental health in criminal proceedings because of the 
risks involved in doing so, or they are constrained in how and 
when they can raise the issue by various state laws. 
A. Competence Not Relevant to Mental State at Time of 
Offense 
As an initial matter, insofar as the BIA mentions 
competence determinations as an opportunity to introduce 
evidence about a defendant’s mental state at the time of an 
offense, it fails to recognize that such determinations focus 
on a defendant’s mental state during the criminal proceeding, 
not at the time of the offense.  A defendant may become 
incompetent after committing an offense, or, conversely, a 
defendant who was incompetent at the time of the offense 
may be restored to competence before the criminal 
proceedings begin.  The mere fact that competence was not 
raised during the criminal proceedings therefore provides no 
information about the defendant’s mental condition at the 
time of the offense, and the BIA has made it quite clear that 
the “particularly serious crime” determination is not 
concerned with events that occur after the crime.15 
In addition, even where the competence inquiry somehow 
sheds light on the defendant’s mental state at the time of the 
offense, defense attorneys often do not raise concerns about 
incompetence for strategic reasons.  Empirical evidence 
shows that defense attorneys harbor doubts about the mental 
capacity of their clients in about 8% to 15% of felony cases, 
but mental health assessments are sought in less than half of 
these.16  Defense attorneys are wary of findings of 
incompetence because they can result in lengthy civil 
 
 15 In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 343 (BIA 2007) (finding that the 
particularly serious crime determination does not focus on facts that occurred 
after the crime was committed). 
 16 Steven K. Hoge et al., Attorney-Client Decision-Making in Criminal Cases: 
Client Competence and Participation as Perceived by Their Attorneys, 10 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 385, 389 (1992); Norman G. Poythress et al., Client Abilities to Assist 
Counsel and Make Decisions in Criminal Cases; Findings from Three Studies, 18 
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 437, 441–43, 446 (1994). 
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commitment.17  If a defendant is found incompetent, efforts 
are made to restore that person to competence, which can 
include the involuntary administration of medications.18  
Defendants who cannot be restored to competence and are 
considered a danger to self or others are subjected to civil 
commitment, which, in many states, can last for an indefinite 
period of time.19 
B. The Insanity Defense 
Unlike mental competence, which is a prerequisite for a 
defendant to stand trial, insanity is an affirmative defense 
that may be raised during the trial.  By making an insanity 
defense, the defendant admits to committing the offense but 
argues lack of culpability due to his or her mental state at the 
time.  While the test used to determine “insanity” varies from 
state to state, there are two dominant approaches.20  Under 
the M’Naughten rule, the trier of fact must determine whether 
the defendant could understand the difference between right 
and wrong and, if not, whether this was due to a mental 
disease or defect.  A less restrictive approach requires 
showing that the defendant lacked sufficient capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his acts, or to conform his actions 
to the requirements of law, due to mental disease or defect.  
Within each of these general approaches, variations exist 
among states.  The burden of proof also varies, with some 
states placing the burden on the government to show that the 
defendant was sane at the time of the offense and others 
requiring the defendant to show insanity at the time of the 
offense.21 
1. Risks Involved in Making an Insanity Defense 
While Matter of G-G-S- suggests that a defendant who was 
mentally ill at the time of the offense would be expected to 
make an insanity defense, thereby allowing the trier of fact to 
take mental health into consideration in determining 
culpability, empirical data clearly indicate otherwise.  Studies 
 
 17 See Robert D. Miller, Criminal Responsibility, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 
OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 200 (R. Rosner, ed., 1994) 
 18 See Dora W. Klein, When Coercion Lacks Care: Competency to Make 
Medical Treatment Decisions and Parens Patriae Civil Commitments, 45 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 561, 571–72 (2012).  
 19 See Miller, supra note 17, at 200.  
 20 See Randy Borum & Solomon M. Fulero, Empirical Research on the 
Insanity Defense and Attempted Reforms: Evidence Toward Informed Policy, 23 
Law & Hum. Behav. 375, 377 (1999). 
 21 See id. at 381–82.  
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show that the insanity defense is raised in only 1% of felony 
cases, and, when raised, it is rarely successful.22  Some 
studies have found that the insanity defense succeeds in one 
out of four cases, while others have found a success rate as 
low as one in a thousand.23  The overall low success rate may 
itself be a deterrent to making the defense, but there are 
other reasons to avoid it as well.  Defendants whose insanity 
defenses are unsuccessful—which represents the vast 
majority of those who raise it—receive significantly longer 
sentences than those who are convicted without having 
argued insanity.24  In other words, defendants pay a penalty 
for arguing insanity and losing. 
Furthermore, in many states, defendants acquitted based 
on insanity often experience longer periods of civil 
commitment than the maximum length of time in prison that 
a defendant could have served for the crime.  This creates an 
incentive for defendants to plead guilty even if they have a 
strong insanity defense.  For example, studies have found 
that in California, New York, Connecticut, Colorado, and the 
District of Columbia, defendants acquitted through an 
insanity defense are confined for longer periods of time than 
convicted individuals.25  Some studies show that individuals 
who succeed with an insanity defense spend nearly twice as 
long in civil commitment as defendants convicted of similar 
crimes spend in prison; additionally, they often face post-
 
 22 Id. at 378; Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of 
Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 BULLETIN AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 
& L. 331, 334–35 (1991).  
 23 See HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING 
INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM,  58–61 (1993); Borum & Fulero, 20 note 20, at 378; 
see also Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental 
Illness and Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL. 7, 
11–12 (2007) (citing a success rate of under 25%); Heather Leigh Stangle, 
Murderous Madonna: Femininity, Violence, and the Myth of Postpartum Mental 
Disorder in Cases of Maternal Infanticide and Filicide, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
699, 728 (2008) (citing a success rate of 1 in 1000 criminal trials); Stephen G. 
Valdes, Comment, Frequency and Success: An Empirical Study of Criminal Law 
Defenses, Federal Constitutional Evidentiary Claims, and Plea Negotiations, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 1709, 1723 (2005) (citing success rates ranging from 0.87% to 
26%). 
 24 Michael L. Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World: The 
Anthropology of Insanity Defense Attitudes, 24 BULLETIN AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & 
L. 5, 12 (1996) [hereinafter Perlin, Myths]; Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the 
Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 599, 650 (1990); Joseph Rodriguez et al., The Insanity Defense 
Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 397, 
401–02 (1983). 
 25 Miller, supra note 17, at 198–215; Eric Silver, Punishment or Treatment? 
Comparing the Lengths of Confinement of Successful and Unsuccessful Insanity 
Defendants, 19 L. &. HUM. BEHAV. 375, 384–87 (1995). 
2016] ASSUMED SANE 31 
release judicial oversight for the rest of their lives.26  One 
study found that in California, individuals acquitted based on 
insanity for nonviolent crimes were confined for nine times as 
long as those convicted.27 
The chance of being promptly released is also much 
higher in some states for those who are convicted than for 
those who are acquitted based on insanity.  For example, in 
Georgia, less than 1% of defendants found not guilty by 
reason of insanity were released upon acquittal, compared to 
30% of those found guilty; in California, 5.5% of defendants 
acquitted based on insanity were released, compared to 29% 
of those convicted; and in Ohio, 7% of defendants acquitted 
based on insanity were released, compared to 32% of those 
convicted.28  Consequently, critics of the insanity defense 
contend that “post-acquittal hospitalization is used to punish 
insanity acquittees.”29 
Defense attorneys must take all of this into consideration 
in advising their clients about whether or not to make an 
insanity defense.  In many states, civil commitment can be 
indefinite, and that possibility may be more frightening to 
defendants than a finite period of incarceration.  The National 
Alliance on Mental Illness has acknowledged that deciding 
whether or not to use the insanity defense is a complex, 
strategic decision that often turns on nuanced and localized 
factors, such as “the attitude of the court and the community 
to mental illness . . . .”30  The risks involved in making an 
insanity defense in criminal proceedings, however, do not 
exist in immigration proceedings, where neither the 
immigration judge nor the Department of Homeland Security 
has the authority to initiate civil commitment or order 
incarceration.31 
 
 26 STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 58–61; Perlin, Myths, supra note 24, 
at 12; Mark Pogrebin et al., Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity: A Research Note, 8 
INT’L J. L. PSYCHIATRY 237, 240 (1986); Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 401–02. 
 27 STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 58–61; Pogrebin et al., supra note 26, 
at 240; Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 401–02. 
 28 Silver, supra note 25, at Table 4. 
 29 Donald M. Linhorst & P. Ann Dirks-Linhorst, A Critical Assessment of 
Disposition Options for Mentally Ill Offenders, 73 SOC. SERV. REV. 65, 73 (1999). 
 30 NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, DEP’T OF POL’Y AND LEGAL AFFAIRS, A 
GUIDE TO MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 25–26, 
http://www.pacenterofexcellence.pitt.edu/documents/Guide_to_Mental_Illnes 
s_and_the_Criminal_Justice_System_NAMI.pdf [http://perma.cc/6Q5Q-CXLM]. 
 31 See generally Fatma E. Marouf, Incompetent but Deportable: The Case For 
a Right to Mental Competence in Removal Proceedings, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 929 
(2014). 
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2. Defendants with Mental Illness May Resist Arguing 
Insanity 
Another problem is that some mentally ill defendants 
refuse to invoke the insanity defense.  While attorneys can 
raise the issue of incompetence even if the client insists she 
is competent, an attorney is supposed to adhere to the 
client’s decision about whether or not to use an insanity 
defense.32  One study found that among 139 cases where 
there was clinical support for an insanity defense, 10% of the 
defendants resisted making the defense and another 15% 
were not receptive to attributing the offense to mental 
illness.33  Thus, one-quarter of the defendants resisted 
arguing insanity even when it was a pivotal issue in the case. 
Such resistance may reflect some defendants’ lack of 
insight into their own mental health conditions, or it may 
result from a desire to avoid “the prospect of psychiatric 
labeling, stigmatization, and indeterminate 
hospitalization . . . .”34  If the latter, those fears may not carry 
as much weight in a situation where deportation and possible 
persecution are on the table, rather than just imprisonment.  
In other words, the balance an individual strikes between the 
potential risks and benefits of acknowledging the role of a 
mental illness in the commission of a crime may well be 
different in a criminal case and an immigration case.  Binding 
a noncitizen facing removal to a decision about mental illness 
made in a criminal case ignores the different stakes involved 
in these two types of proceedings. 
3.  Several States Do Not Recognize an Insanity Defense 
Finally, several states simply do not recognize an insanity 
defense.  Specifically, Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Kansas do 
not recognize the insanity defense.35  Since the U.S. Supreme 
Court has never addressed whether an insanity defense is 
constitutionally required, several state courts have upheld its 
abolishment.36  Nevada’s legislature abolished the insanity 
 
 32 See STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEF. 
FUNCTION § 4-5.2 & cmt. at 199-202 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993).  
 33 Richard J. Bonnie et al., Decision-Making in Criminal Defense: An 
Empirical Study of Insanity Pleas and the Impact of Doubted Client Competence, 
87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 48, 54–55 (1996). 
 34 Id. at 58. 
 35 See IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (1995); 
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-14-214 (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1999).  
 36 See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 791–802 (1952) (declining to specify 
a particular insanity test required by due process); see also Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 96 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“States are free to 
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defense in 1995, but the Nevada Supreme Court held that it 
was constitutionally required in 2001.37  The U.S. Supreme 
Court declined certiorari in this case, despite the conflict with 
the rulings of other state courts.  The absence of Supreme 
Court authority on this issue makes it possible for additional 
states to abolish the insanity defense in the future. 
Prohibiting immigration judges from considering mental 
health status at the time of an offense under the theory that 
its role in culpability has already been addressed by the 
criminal court ignores the fact that not all defendants are 
allowed to argue not guilty by reason of insanity.  Under G-G-
S-, these individuals are subjected to the double penalty of 
not being able to argue insanity in either criminal or 
immigration proceedings. 
C. Limitations of Mens Rea Defenses Based on Mental 
Illness 
Even if a defendant does not or cannot make an insanity 
defense, she may be able to introduce evidence of mental 
illness to try to prove the absence of the requisite mens rea.38  
Mens rea defenses are not, however, available to all 
defendants.  First, many crimes are strict liability offenses.  
Since no specific mental state is required as an element of 
these offenses, evidence of mental illness may never be 
introduced during the criminal proceedings.  Similarly, 
mental illness is not a defense to crimes that require only 
negligence.39 
Second, when people with mental illness commit crimes 
that do require intent, lack of mens rea “is extremely rare.”40  
Daniel M’Naghten, for example, had delusions of a Tory plot 
to kill him and therefore formed a preemptive plan to kill the 
Prime Minister.41  When he mistakenly killed the Prime 
Minister’s Secretary, he intended to kill a person, and 
 
recognize and define the insanity defense as they see fit.”). 
 37 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035 (1997); Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 86 
(Nev. 2001) (holding that the abolition of the insanity defense violated due 
process), cert denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002). 
 38 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (“Evidence that the 
defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is 
relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is 
an element of the offense.”); Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting 
the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, n. 2 (2000). 
 39 Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between 
Legal Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1090 (2007); Slobogin, supra note 38, at 1239. 
 40 Slobogin, supra note 38, at 1205. 
 41 Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1089. 
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therefore would not be able to negate the mens rea for the 
crime.42  Likewise, when Andrea Yates drowned her five 
children because she believed Satan would otherwise torment 
them, she had the intent to kill, despite the delusional 
circumstances surrounding the murder.43  As Christopher 
Slobogin has observed, “most people with mental disorder 
who cause harm mean to do so, albeit sometimes for reasons 
that seem irrational.”44  Similarly, Morse and Hoffman 
conclude that only on “rare occasions” is mental illness 
inconsistent with the formation of mens rea.45 
Third, states may prohibit evidence of mental illness from 
being used to show that the defendant did not possess the 
requisite mens rea.  In Clark v. Arizona, the Supreme Court 
examined the constitutionality of an Arizona rule that 
prohibited the admission of expert psychiatric evidence and 
other evidence of mental disorder, short of legal insanity, to 
negate mens rea.46  The Court found it permissible for 
Arizona to exclude “mental disease evidence” and “capacity 
evidence,” although it found that “observation evidence” must 
be admitted.47  Under Clark, states may exclude testimony, 
usually provided by experts, about the defendant’s mental 
disorder and capacity for cognition and moral judgment, 
which bear directly on the ability to form the requisite mens 
rea.  But even where evidence of a mental disorder is 
admitted into evidence to help show the defendant’s capacity 
to form a mental state, such evidence “will almost never help 
resolve whether that state was formed in fact.”48 
D. Drawbacks of “Guilty But Mentally Ill” Verdict 
The BIA’s decision in G-G-S- mentions that the 
respondent had not presented any evidence of “a plea of 
guilty by reason of insanity.”49  This phrase appears to 
conflate the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of 
 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 1089–90. 
 44 Slobogin, supra note 38, at 1205 (describing four situations where mens 
rea is absent—involuntary action, mistake as to results, mistake as to 
circumstances, and ignorance of the law—and arguing that mental illness is 
most likely to play a role in the third scenario). 
 45 Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1090. 
 46 548 U.S. 735 (2006) (examining, inter alia, the constitutionality of the 
Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. 
1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1234 (1997)). 
 47 Scholars have criticized the lack of clarity in this tripartite formulation.  
See, e.g., Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1104–11.  
 48 Id. at 1089. 
 49 Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 346 (BIA 2014). 
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insanity with the verdict of “guilty but mentally ill” (GBMI).  
In many states, GBMI requires proof, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the defendant committed the act and was aware 
of its wrongfulness but had a mental disorder that 
substantially impaired his ability to conform his conduct to 
the law.50  Defendants who plead GBMI are still guilty and 
therefore criminally culpable.  They are subject to 
incarceration and may even receive the death penalty.  A 
GBMI verdict does not even provide additional treatment 
opportunities.  The GBMI verdict differs from a regular guilty 
verdict only by recognizing that the defendant had a mental 
disorder at the time of the offense.  Some defendants 
mistakenly perceive GBMI as reducing culpability.  In reality, 
GBMI requires the defendant to admit to an additional 
stigmatizing fact while receiving nothing in return.51  
Consequently, GBMI has been described as “a politically 
expedient ‘third-way’ fraud.”52 
Pleas are the most common way that GBMI verdicts 
occur.53  Commentators have recognized that “these pleas 
appear to reflect civil commitment concerns for the best 
interests of the client.”54  In other words, as discussed above, 
defendants may decline to use an insanity defense and 
instead plead GBMI in order to avoid a lengthy or indefinite 
civil commitment.  But there is also an advantage to pleading 
guilty instead of GBMI, since GBMI verdicts tend to result in 
longer sentences than mentally ill defendants receive with 
typical guilty pleas.55  In the aftermath of G-G-S-, noncitizen 
defendants may now have to choose whether to plead to 
GBMI in order to make it clear for the removal proceedings 
that mental illness played a role in the offense or to simply 
plead guilty to get a shorter sentence. 
 
 50 Borum & Fulero, supra note 20, at 382–83. 
 51 Linda C. Fentiman, “Guilty but Mentally Ill”: The Real Verdict is Guilty, 26 
B.C. L. REV. 601, 605 (1985); Mark A. Woodmansee, The Guilty but Mentally Ill 
Verdict: Political Expediency at the Expense of Moral Principle, 10 NOTRE DAME J. 
L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 341, 361–77 (1996). 
 52 Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1122. 
 53 John Klofas & Ralph Weisheit, Pleading Guilty but Mentally Ill: Adversarial 
Justice and Mental Health, 9 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 491, 493–94 (1986). 
 54 Id. at 491. 
 55 INSTITUTE ON MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE LAW, THE GUILTY BUT MENTALLY 
ILL VERDICT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY, 1–78 (1985); see also Lisa A. Callahan et al., 
Measuring the Effects of the Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI) Verdict: Georgia’s 1982 
GBMI Reform, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 447, 449 (1992). 
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E. Constraints and Discretion in Sentencing 
The BIA indicates in Matter of G-G-S- that sentencing is 
another phase of the criminal proceeding where mental 
health issues are taken into consideration.56  The defendant’s 
probation officer typically includes a mental health history in 
the presentencing report.  Yet judges may be constrained in 
their ability to consider mental illness by sentencing 
guidelines, or, on the other end of the spectrum, they may 
decline to exercise the discretion they are given to consider 
mental illness during sentencing. 
Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, mental and 
emotional conditions may be considered in sentencing if 
“present to an unusual degree.”57  A downward departure 
may be justified if  “(1) the defendant committed the offense 
while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity; 
and (2) the significantly reduced mental capacity contributed 
substantially to the commission of the offense.”58  The 
Guidelines further explain that the extent of the departure 
“should reflect the extent to which the reduced mental 
capacity contributed to the commission of the offense.”59  
Downward departure is prohibited, however, if voluntary use 
of drugs or intoxicants caused the reduced mental capacity, if 
the facts indicate a need to protect the public, or if the 
defendant was convicted of certain enumerated offenses.60 
Some state sentencing guidelines track the U.S. 
Guidelines’ language about downward departures for 
diminished mental capacity.61  Others give judges broad 
discretion to consider any mitigating factors without 
specifically mentioning mental condition.62  Johnston notes 
that “a state’s failure to enumerate vulnerability due to a 
mental condition as a mitigating factor might suggest an 
inability to depart on this basis.”63  But even in situations 
 
 56 Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 345 (BIA 2014). 
 57 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015).  Federal courts have also at times relied on Guidelines §§ 5K2.0, 5H1.4, 
and 5K2.13 provisions for downward departure based on suspected or 
demonstrated hardship in prison.  See E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just 
Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
147, 153 n.21 (2013). 
 58 GUIDELINES § 5K2.13. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(d)(18) (2012); CAL. RULES OF COURT § 
4.423(b)(2) (2012). 
 62 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6815(c)(1) (2007 & Supp. 2011).  
 63 Johnston, supra note 57, at 153. 
2016] ASSUMED SANE 37 
where judges recognize that sentencing is discretionary, 
“there is no guarantee that the appropriate role of mental 
abnormality will be considered or that individual sentencing 
judges will calibrate punishment properly even if they do take 
mental abnormality into account.”64 
Perhaps most importantly, the empirical evidence 
discussed above indicates that in cases where defendants are 
convicted after having raised mental health issues, the 
sentences actually turn out to be longer than if they had not 
raised the issue at all.65  This evidence undercuts the notion 
in G-G-S- that sentences take into consideration the role of 
mental illness so there is no need for immigration judges to 
consider the issue.  Furthermore, in prior decisions, the BIA 
has indicated that the sentence imposed is the least 
important factor in the “particularly serious crime” 
determination, because it is “not the most accurate or salient 
factor to consider in determining the seriousness of an 
offense.”66  If the length of the sentence is not that important, 
then it makes little sense to suggest that mental illness need 
not be considered because any role it played is already 
reflected in the sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
In foreclosing the opportunity for immigration judges to 
consider evidence of mental illness in determining whether an 
offense constitutes a “particularly serious crime,” the BIA 
assumes that the conviction and sentence already 
incorporate the role that mental illness played in the offense.  
But that assumption is flawed.  Strong incentives exist for 
defendants not to raise the issue of mental illness in criminal 
proceedings, such as avoiding indefinite civil commitment if 
acquitted or a longer sentence if convicted.  Furthermore, not 
all states allow defendants to make an insanity defense or to 
use evidence of mental illness to negate mens rea.  Finally, 
when it comes to sentencing, judges may be constrained by 
sentencing guidelines or may simply decide, in the exercise of 
discretion, not to use mental illness as a mitigating factor.  
 
 64 Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1122. 
 65 See supra text accompanying note 28.  
 66 In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 343 (BIA 2007).  In this case, the BIA 
found that “the sentence imposed is not a dominant factor in determining 
whether a conviction is for a particularly serious crime.” Id.  The BIA also 
minimized the importance of factors that occur subsequent to the offense, such 
as cooperation with law enforcement, explaining that they “bear only on 
sentencing.” Id. 
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The sentence therefore does not necessarily take into account 
the role of mental illness in the offense.  Given these facts, 
immigration judges should be allowed to consider the role of 
mental illness in determining whether an offense constitutes 
a “particularly serious crime.” 
Depriving immigration judges of this power places 
individuals with mental illness in danger of being deported to 
countries where they face a serious risk of persecution.  Even 
someone who demonstrates a greater than fifty percent 
chance of persecution may be deported based on a 
“particularly serious crime.”  Matter of G-G-S- also places 
unreasonable demands on criminal defense attorneys, who 
must advise defendants about the immigration consequences 
of a plea in order to provide effective assistance of counsel.67  
Such consequences include preserving relief from removal, 
which means avoiding bars like a conviction for a 
“particularly serious crime.”  By limiting immigration judges 
to the findings of the criminal court regarding the role that 
mental illness played in a crime, Matter of G-G-S- places 
defense attorneys in the extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
position of having to navigate the conflicting consequences of 
raising mental health issues in two totally different 
proceedings.  In some cases, this means choosing between an 
indefinite amount of time in an institution and persecution. 
 
 
 67 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373–74 (2009). 
